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1. Rescuing Religion… 
Religion, the religious, the sacred, transcendence, spirituality: these classic, complex and 
diffuse concepts are back on the philosophical agenda, so it appears. The various philosophies 
of difference and of deconstruction in particular, involved as they are in radically calling into 
question the discourse of modern humanism, have created a renewed interest in religion on a 
fundamental and on a practical level: an interest in the philosophical meaning of religion, as 
well as in the concrete and tangible ‘turn’ to religious experiences and practices in post-
modern culture. This growing philosophical interest can be detected on both sides of the 
Atlantic, whether philosophers are attempting to reassess or restate the Western legacy of – 
predominantly Christian – traditions and institutions, or conversely try to ‘invent’ new, 
‘secular’, and adventurous concepts and approaches to religion. I will not examine the issue of 
the increasing philosophical popularity of religion any further here, except for making one 
key observation that seems very relevant to me in this context. 
Among contemporary philosophers who have, in many different ways, turned to the 
study of religion, one often finds an interesting tendency: the tendency to rescue religion, 
however minimal or reticent this rescue operation might be. They try to save something of/in 
religion that should be kept ‘safe’ in their view from the immense criticism that religion has 
been subjected to in modern thinking, with which they otherwise – apart from this small 
remainder to be saved, this ‘rest’ as some of the authors in question call it – fully agree. My 
hypothesis is that this saving-something-of/in-religion usually follows the ambivalent 
structure and discourse of kenosis. 
 
2. …By Rescuing Kenosis: Distance over against Proximity 
Kenosis can be described as one of the key notions that evoke the complex relationship 
between God and humanity, between transcendence and immanence, between the sacred and 
the profane, between the Other and the Self − in short, the religious relationship, or the 
specific and enigmatic relationship we call religion. If it is true that on a fundamental level 
kenosis is this relationship, then we can observe that many of today’s leading thinkers on 
religion are actually interested in the problem of kenosis again. With some of them kenosis is 
explicitly and prominently present as a crucial concept used, discussed, or criticised; in most 
others the problem or question of kenosis implicitly plays a role in their thought, but the 
concept is not treated explicitly. In any case, whether it is an ingredient on the surface of their 
writings or operating in the background, kenosis, originally an ancient Christian notion 
derived from Paul’s letter to the Philippians (2: 6-8), is used to refer to two entirely opposite 
meanings with regard to the religious relationship. It is this ambiguity of kenosis that interests 
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me in particular in what follows. We will discover that the ‘problem’ of kenosis we 
mentioned above, is precisely this ambiguity. 
* Examples of the first meaning can be found in thinkers, who stress the infinite 
distance between God and humanity. This is implicitly there in Jean-Luc Marion or 
Jean Louis Chrétien, more explicitly in Emmanuel Levinas or - in America - in Mark 
C. Taylor. Here kenosis literally means the ‘emptying’, the exhausting of any positive 
relationship between God and human beings. Radical transcendence, infinite ‘erring’ 
(Taylor), the divine secret (Chrétien), and the Heideggerian critique of onto-theology 
are the prime notions here, and echoes of the medieval tradition of negative theology 
(Marion) can be heard. The being ‘otherwise than being’ (Levinas) of God is at stake 
here and should be retained as the kenotic moment of religion, the only aspect of 
religion that would be worthy of preservation in ‘post-modernity’.1 
Going back in time a little further we find examples of this first meaning of 
kenosis in 20th century theology, especially in Karl Barth’s work and in the 
tradition of ‘dialectical theology’ of which he an originator. His program to rescue 
the Christian God from natural theology as well as from the ‘Kulturreligion’ of his 
time is a typically kenotic operation, postulating a crucial void, emptiness, or 
distance between the divine and the human. Nonetheless, towards the end of my 
essay we will discover that Barth’s work is a bit more complicated in this respect. 
* The second meaning, however, opens up an entirely different discourse, pointing at 
the proximity of the divine and the human ‘worlds’. Keeping in mind the original 
Christian meaning of God becoming human in Christ (God ‘empties’ himself in order 
to become human), kenosis is considered the ‘friendship’ of high and low, of God and 
humankind, and of a certain de-hierarchisation and de-totalisation of the religious 
relationship. The only religion that should be retained in our pluralistic times is a 
kenotic religion, i.e., a religion in which the humiliation and vulgarisation of the 
Highest Being or the Being beyond Being is the central event and experience. Since 
this discourse of friendship and proximity is a slightly more recent and less well-
known development than the discourse of distance described above as the first 
meaning of kenosis, I will give a number of more detailed examples of the former. 
 
Zizek: a Political Discourse of Proximity 
The Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Zizek on a political level supports the idea of kenosis as 
infinite proximity, for example. To him, the ‘death of the Son of God’ on the cross − the pre-
eminent kenotic event − is a mysterious, but ultimately ‘happy’ event, ‘giving birth to a new 
subject no longer rooted in a particular substance, redeemed of all particular links’. Kenosis is 
‘happy’ because here God and human beings come together to form a new humanity that 
sheds its old nationalistic and ethnic identities (Zizek calls them ‘substances’, ‘links’, 
‘phantasms’) which have terrorised south-eastern Europe, e.g., at least since the fall of the 
Berlin Wall. The Christian legacy is ‘worth fighting for’, because its kenotic structure 
sacrifices identities (and their conservatism or even fundamentalism) in order to open up new 
possibilities for our socio-political reality. The spiritual reality of the Holy Spirit (to Zizek a 
                                                 
1
 For an elaborate survey and evaluation of this way of thinking about the religious relationship, see Ilse N. 
Bulhof, Laurens ten Kate (eds.), Flight of the Gods. Philosophical Perspectives on Negative Theology, New 
York: Fordham University Press 2000. See on Levinas and kenosis Renée van Riessen’s contribution to this 
volume, on Taylor and kenosis Leddy Karelse’s contribution. 
Regarding non-contemporary sources for this first meaning of kenosis one may well mention Pascal, the late 
Schelling, and esp. Kierkegaard, as far as philosophy is concerned; in theology, one may point to Barth’s work 
(see just below), and to a rich tradition of Jewish thought (e.g. Buber, Rosenzweig). 
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much more essential outcome of the kenosis on the cross than the resurrection) fights and 
replaces the phantasmatic reality of the soil and the ethnos. But this new ‘presence’ of the 
Spirit, which is Zizek’s secular and quite radically Hegelian modulation of Christian 
pneumatology, is yet to come − and fragile. Now this becoming ‘fragile’ of the Absolute is 
what must be kept, be saved of religion, or, more precisely, of the western religious legacy, 
Christianity.2 
 
Milbank: a Linguistic Discourse of Proximity as Incarnation 
We find quite a different example of the same discourse of proximity in John Milbank’s 
attempts to define kenosis as the incarnation of God in human language. Here language as a 
gift from the Creator, in which He himself is involved via Christ’s kenosis − emptying, 
exhausting himself in becoming human − serves as the ‘meeting point’ of the divine and the 
human. Christ’s kenosis is supposed to involve the disruption of the Logos with its claims to 
identity, unity and universality, and the liberation of language towards a plurality of 
meanings, truths and values. A new ‘participation’ of human beings and God is supposed to 
be the result of this liberating incarnation, aiming at overcoming the ‘void’ between them.3 
Zizek’s political criticism of identity appears as a linguistic criticism of identity here. 
 
Vattimo: an Existential Discourse of Proximity 
Probably the most important protagonist of the discourse of proximity and friendship, 
however, is Gianni Vattimo.4 Kenosis is not only a central concept, but also indeed a central 
experience in his work: object of study and analysis as well as subject of inspiration. Here, we 
find a truly existential criticism of the logic of identity that has dominated modernity, parallel 
to the political and linguistic criticisms of which Zizek and Milbank resp. were shown to be 
examples. Kenosis, according to Vattimo, not only forms an interesting part of Christian 
doctrine, it is or rather should be the essence of the divine and of belief or religion in general. 
Of course the second meaning of kenosis, the model of friendship and togetherness, is applied 
here in a massive way: the Absolute must be ‘weakened’, just like Zizek wants, if it has not 
always been ‘weak’ and ‘fragile’ in the first place, at least since it received its Christian form 
in the gospels, only to be perverted by the Logos of metaphysics that has contaminated 
Western-Christian thought in Vattimo’s opinion. ‘The violence of the transcendent principle, 
the ground that silences all questions should be eliminated.’5 Silence and ‘unknowing’, vital 
motives in the first meaning of kenosis, are taken over by the abundance of symbolic 
polysemy and the richness of infinite interpretation. God is no longer beyond human 
existence, human speech and action, but completely involved in it: He is engaged in this feast 
of reason and language that only the post-modern, i.e. the post-metaphysical epoch has been 
able to unleash. In fact, we should have the courage to say, Vattimo’s states, that God quite 
simply is this feast of language and nothing else; the divine is involved in our history, has 
                                                 
2
 See S. Zizek, The Fragile Absolute − or, why is the christian legacy worth fighting for?, London/New York: 
Verso 2000, 158. 
3
 See J. Milbank, The Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, and Culture, Oxford: Blackwell 1997, and J. 
Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, Graham Ward (eds.), Radical Orthodoxy: a New Theology, London: Routledge 
1999, esp. Milbank, Pickstock, Ward, ‘Introduction: Suspending the Material: the Turn of Radical Theology’, 1-
20; 3/4: ‘The central theological framework of radical orthodoxy is ‘participation’ as developed by Plato and 
reworked by Christianity, because any alternative configuration perforce reserves a territory independent of 
God’. 
4
 See esp. his Belief, trans. Luca d’Isanto and David Webb, Cambridge: Polity Press 1999; orig. Italian 1996; and 
his Beyond Interpretation: the Meaning of Hermeneutics for Philosophy, trans. David Webb, Cambridge: Polity 
Press 1996. 
5
 L. d’Isanto, Introduction, in G. Vattimo, Belief, 10. 
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entered the horizon of our language, only to become the last holy symbol left to us: the 
symbol of peaceful, dialogical and pluralistic communication. Early Christian kenosis has 
therefore reached its belated fulfilment in secular times, in particular in our times, in which 
the ‘Great Narratives’ of modern culture have evaporated. Vattimo even goes so far as to 
equate kenosis with God’s presumed declaration of friendship, taking not only Philippians 2: 
6-8 as the key reference for his theory of kenosis, but also John 15: 15: ‘No longer do I call 
you servants… I have called you friends’.6 
 
3. The loss of relationship in Vattimo’s discussion of kenosis 
So, what is happening here? One feature of Vattimo’s idea of kenosis is of special interest to 
me here, and this is what will be discussed in what follows. Although the author of Belief 
beautifully evokes kenosis as an event, an occurrence between God and human beings 
suggesting some kind of relationship between the two, the outcome of this event makes any 
real relationship impossible. Vattimo adopts a truly fusional discourse: in kenosis, the infinite 
confrontation, the tension between God and human beings, their being exposed to each other 
has been abolished in favour of their fusion. Vattimo is so happy to prove and plead for the 
radical historicity of God, for His inner-worldliness, for His being non-authoritarian and ‘just 
like us’ that in the end of his kenotic adventure the entire duality of God and human beings is 
diluted, suppressed and finally negated. In kenosis, and indeed in any idea of religion that 
would be worth rescuing in our times, humanity is all-important: humanity integrates and 
absorbs the divine. The radical pluralism and contingency of language, mirroring the 
pluralism and contingency of reality, of Being as a whole, is supplied with a divine aura. If 
God is to be found anywhere, it is in and as this pluralism − our pluralism; in other words, it 
is in and as us. Remarkable as it may seem, this is the consequence of Vattimo’s strategy of 
weakening: God is weakened in His alterity, whereas humanity − in its secular, post-modern 
state − is strengthened, even glorified. If God is anywhere, He ‘is’ us. 
This implication of Vattimo’s reading of kenosis, however popular this reading may 
be among those interested in and inspired by the turn to religion in our times mentioned 
earlier, is quite shocking. After all, the protest against the static, dichotomistic transcendence 
of the ‘old’ metaphysical God (with His parameters of Truth, Unity, Authority etc.) is 
radicalised towards a protest against transcendence as such. Transcendence is pronounced 
taboo in his texts. However, without transcendence, or rather, in relational terms, without ‘an 
other’, without otherness, there can be no relationship; and − taking the next step, following 
from the first immediately − without relationship, there can be no religion. If the enigmatic 
relationship between God and human beings, if the primordial as well as historical experience 
of an ‘outside’, of a limit to human history and existence, of the ‘sacred’ or the ‘inhuman’, is 
kenotically sacrificed for the total absorption of this relationship into human history, then in 
the end religion is sacrificed for the ‘purified faith of secularisation’.7 Vattimo’s rehabilitation 
of belief and Christianity boils down to a Christianity without duality − without this strange 
and irritating little word: God. What remains, what is saved of religion, is only the plurality of 
human meanings, interpretations, truths, desires, creations and communications in which God 
and human beings participate as indistinguishable friends. Monotheism is made obsolete by 
monopluralism.8 
                                                 
6
 Belief, 55. 
7
 Belief, 46. 
8
 Those thinkers, who  pay attention to this difficult duality each in their own way, are all too easily dismissed by 
Vattimo. He criticises existentialist philosophy of religion for its scepticism about the human condition and its 
plea for a ‘leap of faith’ – Pascal, Kierkegaard – (Belief, 39) and ‘apocalyptic’ theology (87) or dialectical 
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So, if Vattimo − seen as the most powerful representative of the current discourse of 
proximity, fusing kenosis with friendship − reduces the religious relationship to peace and 
‘continuity’9, he in fact loses this relationship altogether. God plays no part in this relationship 
of humanity to itself, except as a symbol and ‘example’ (in Christ’s kenosis) of human 
pluralism that will triumph as ‘charity’ and ‘tenderness’ on earth in the end.10 
Yet no relationship and certainly not the religious relationship, can do without the 
duality of the ‘more than one’, the ‘one to one’, the ‘facing one another’ and the tension that 
goes with it; and this duality presupposes strangeness, separation, interruption, discontinuity, 
conflict, misunderstanding, antagonism, as well as friendship, proximity and peace. One 
might even argue, as the tradition of thought on friendship (from Aristotle to Nietzsche and 
Bataille − virtually ignored by Vattimo) has done so often and so convincingly, that no 
friendship is possible without separation and conflict: without enmity. Every relationship 
essentially needs an other, who at one moment may be far away and very close at another, 
who may be friend and enemy almost at the same time; and precisely because of this every 
relationship is, in a way, violent. Since the religious relationship more than any relationship 
bears the marks and stamps of strangeness and separation, of difference, one of the relating 
poles being non-human, being ‘God’, it is always a violent rapport from the outset. The 
essential asymmetry of this rapport (how can one relate to ‘no-body’, to someone who is the 
radical opposite of humanity, who always is ‘present’ in his withdrawal − how can one relate 
to a ‘god’?) implies an enormous tension between God and human beings, in which both 
friendship and enmity, peace and violence, proximity and distance should be granted their 
place.11 
If one misses this ambivalence of the relationship between God and human beings, if 
one misses the impossibility and improbability of it, one misses religion altogether. Religion 
is only possible as an impossible intrusion into our existence, whether it brings joy and 
friendship or fear and conflict: an intrusion in which God and human beings are mutually 
involved, haunting and wounding, loving and touching each other, and above all losing, just 
for a moment, their ‘identities’, their ‘substances’ as Zizek would say. Religion is the 
relational event between God and human beings. And in this event anything can happen, 
nothing is guaranteed; it is the realm of the wholly unexpected or, anticipating a word I will 
return to later on, of singularity. 
                                                                                                                                                        
theology (48, note; the critique is weakened obligatorily in the ‘Post-Scriptum’, 95) for stressing a vertical 
relationship to God. On the other hand Nietzsche and Heidegger are all too quickly called in as allies. On 
Vattimo’s rather naive reading of Nietzsche, see Theo W.A. de Wit, ‘The Return to Religion. Vattimo’s 
Reconciliation of Christian Faith and Post-modern Philosophy’, in Bijdragen. Journal for Philosophy and 
Theology 61 (2000), 390-411. 
9
 Belief, 48, note. 
10
 Belief, 98. 
11
 This fundamental violence of and in the religious relationship as such is, of course, not identical with the 
practical violence committed in the name of religion, nor is this fundamental peace or friendship that might be a 
possibility of the religious relationship identical with the practical pacificatory and humanitarian work done in 
the name of religion. Nevertheless the tension I have described can be rephrased without much effort in terms of 
the painful discrepancy of religious practices around the world today. From the terror of the Lord’s Resistance 
Army in North-Uganda to the interventions of the Truth Committee in South-Africa: in other words, from 
religion kidnapping young children in order to brainwash and train them to participate in murder squadrons of 
God, which are supposed to bring revolution to a country – in this case Uganda – and install a Heavenly 
Kingdom, to the impressive as well as controversial public rituals of confession, forgiveness, and reconciliation 
directed by a black bishop, Tutu,  and meant to help people come to terms with the terror of comparable murder 
squadrons in the land of Apartheid – both extremes belong to this elusive and irritating phenomenon called 
religion, which simply will not disappear from our international socio-political scene in spite of quite a history of 
secularisation. 
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Meanwhile, in Vattimo’s idea of kenosis, the ambivalence of violence and peace is 
unthinkable, and here lies the blind spot of his argument, which, I repeat, actually means that 
the religious relationship as such is the blind spot of his kenotic approach. Vattimo’s praise of 
Christian kenosis is the dilution of religion, and in particular of Christianity; his difficulties in 
taking seriously Christ’s crucifixion − the core event of kenosis, in which it is ‘finished’ as the 
gospels proclaim12 − and his inclination to allegorise and moralise the violence of the cross in 
a highly abstract manner, is only one of the proofs of this dilution.13 
 
4. Toward an Economy of Distance and Proximity: Derrida and a Third Meaning of Kenosis 
So there can only be a relationship − an event − between God and human beings, there can 
only be religion, if the ambivalence I analysed above is, in a sense, active and operational. 
There can only be a relationship if there is distance, otherness, separation and at the same time 
proximity, approaching, touching, contact, exposure. With their version of kenosis, the 
exponents of the discourse of proximity described above try to do away with this ‘double 
bind’, Vattimo being their pre-eminent spokesman. On the other hand, with their version of 
kenosis, the exponents of the discourse of distance − although they pay far more attention to 
the complex duality of the religious relationship than their counterparts − equally try to do 
away with the double bind: the concrete and the ‘taking place’ in time of the event of kenosis, 
God and human beings baring themselves to one another, humanity touching divinity, divinity 
touching humanity, or in theological language: the incarnational centre of kenosis, remains 
the unthinkable part in their thought. 
 So far it may have gradually become clear that the opposition of the two meanings of 
kenosis belongs to a scheme that is in itself insufficient for a philosophical analysis and 
understanding of religion, and of its ‘turn’ or ‘return’ into 21st century culture. We need to 
study and analyse the economy of both aspects of kenosis, instead of bringing them into 
diametrical and static opposition to each other. We need to confront the constant ‘negotiation’ 
between both extremes, and to underline the ‘undecidability’ of both kenotic operations. This 
negotiation between the pure and the vulgar, between distance and proximity, between 
hierarchy and friendship, might well be unavoidable in any conception of religion. Among the 
thinkers of this ‘third way’, affirming, in a sense, the intricate complexity of the two kenoses, 
Jacques Derrida is without any doubt the most powerful and important. In his work one finds 
a thorough account of what I would like to call an economy of kenosis, an ‘econokenosis’ that 
lies at the heart of the religious relationship. In formulating this economy, Derrida attempts to 
                                                 
12
 John 19:30. The Greek text reads τετελεσται, which rather means ‘having reached its goal’, ‘fulfilled’. 
13
 Vattimo relies heavily on René Girard’s critical equation of the sacred and violence in Violence and the Sacred 
(trans. P. Gregory, London: Athlone Press 1988; orig. 1972). Basically Girard claims that true religion should be 
without sacrifice, but the biblical Crucifixion of Christ would be a different story… In Vattimo’s words: ‘Jesus’ 
incarnation did not take place to supply the father with a victim adequate to his wrath; rather, Jesus came into the 
world precisely to reveal and abolish the nexus between violence and the sacred. He was put to death because 
such a revelation was intolerable to a humanity rooted in the violent tradition of sacrificial religions.’ (Belief, 37) 
Of course the idea of a wrathful God sadistically sending down his son is rightly rejected by Girard and Vattimo. 
But the event of the cross is the key event to which the entire narrative of the four synoptic gospels clearly leads 
and for which each gospel carefully prepares its readers, linking this event to the Hebrew Scriptures. In Pauline 
theology kenosis is subsequently made to cohere explicitly with the same event of the cross. Of course Vattimo 
is free to eliminate the violence of this event from kenosis, but to present this as a new and better reading of the 
Scriptures is rather unconvincing, to say the least. That God would sacrifice his own son only to show an evil 
humanity that sacrifice is wrong, seems to be quite an artificial and superficial interpretation of this tragedy, 
which the New Testament displays four times. That the ‘evil humanity’ Vattimo accuses in retrospect consists of 
the Jewish people, whose religion can hardly be counted among the ‘traditions of sacrificial religions’ adds to the 
unhistorical character of Vattimo’s and Girard’s philosophical improvisations. 
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understand in an original way religion’s healing and violating structure, its salvific and 
haunting features, its ‘making us whole and holy’ and its tearing us apart, its construction and 
destruction, its hope and despair, in short, its being radically good and radically evil. One will 
immediately notice that an entire tradition of thought reverberates here, from Kant’s insights 
into the difficult relationship of religion and reason, e.g., via Kierkegaard’s anti-dialectical, 
paradoxical treatment of religious experience, to Otto’s double determination of the 
mysterium. Still, Derrida’s decision to rethink all these programmatic efforts to break up the 
one-sidedness and self-containment of religion in terms of an economy is innovative in 
contemporary philosophy of religion.14 
 
5. Econokenosis: the Place of différance 
The concept of economy is decisively present in Derrida’s earlier writings, notably in Writing 
and Difference (orig. 196715). It is then continuously refined and discussed by Derrida until 
‘Economimesis’ (197516).17 Later it recedes to the background a bit. The term is used less 
frequently, but still plays a crucial role in Derrida’s research. 
But what is economy? It has very little to do with the logic of calculation, production, 
utility and gain that belongs to economics; on the contrary, to Derrida it is a philosophical 
category that at first calls into question every type of oppositional or dualistic thinking. 
Economy designates two or more extremes or poles, two or more binary entities (for example, 
good and evil, truth and lying, past and future, life and death, or I and the other), in order to 
give full attention to their interplay. Precisely in their being opposed  the poles do no longer 
rest − and actually never have rested − in themselves, as if they were pre-existing substances, 
but they are exposed to one another in a play of negotiation, contamination, mutual influence, 
and manipulation, etc. In short, they never form a pure opposition, but are always already 
involved in a third term: a ‘household’ (οικονοµια), an economy between them in which they 
are no longer fully themselves. Economy as a concept that continuously calls into question the 
stable oppositions that structure western thought and culture by turning them into what they 
do not want to be, a dynamics, thus wounds any dialectic system as well. Dialectics accept a 
                                                 
14
 I would include the following authors among contemporary thinkers interested in this ‘third way’, stressing a 
certain economy of religion and avoiding any idealistic theory of religion. Explicitly following Derrida: 
Rodolphe Gasché, Inventions of Difference. On Jacques Derrida, Cambridge, Mass./London: Harvard 
University Press 1994, esp. ch. 6: ‘God, for Example’, 150-170; John D. Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of 
Jacques Derrida. Religion without Religion, Bloomington/Indianapolis: Indiana University Press 1997; Hent de 
Vries, Philosophy and the Turn to Religion, Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University Press 1999. Working 
in a less ‘Derridean’ but nonetheless related way: Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘La déconstruction du christianisme’, in Les 
Études Philosophiques 4/1998, 503-519; Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer. Le pouvoir souverain et la vie nue, 
Paris: Seuil 1997 (orig. 1995), and Le temps qui reste. Un commentaire de l’Épître aux Romains, Paris: Rivages 
2000 (orig. 2000); Alain Badiou, Saint Paul. La fondation de l’universalisme, Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France 1997; Marcel Gauchet, Le désenchantement du monde. Une histoire politique de la religion, Paris: 
Gallimard 1985; and Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reason of Power in Christianity and 
Islam, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1993. 
Derrida’s other relevant publications on religion (not mentioned below) include: ‘How to Avoid Speaking: 
Denials’, trans. K. Frieden, in S. Budick, W. Iser (eds.), Languages of the Unsayable: The Play of Negativity in 
Literature and Literary Theory, New York: Columbia University Press 1989, 3-70; ‘Avances’, Introduction to 
Serge Margel, Le Tombeau du dieu artisan: Sur Platon, Paris: Minuit 1995, 11-43; and ‘Faith and Knowledge. 
The Two Sources of ‘Religion’ within the Mere Limits of Reason’, in J. Derrida, G. Vattimo (eds.), Religion, 
trans. S. Weber, Stanford: Stanford University Press 1998, 1-78 (orig. 1996). 
15
 Trans. Alan Bass, London: Routledge 1978 
16
 In S. Agacinski et al., Mimesis: Des articulations, Paris: Aubier-Flammarion 1975, 57-93. 
17
 For a detailed study of the concept of economy in Derrida, see Joost de Bloois, Derrida et l’économie, 
dissertation, University of Utrecht, forthcoming 2002; and Gido Berns, Kringloop en Woekering. Een 
deconstructieve filosofie van de economie, Amsterdam: Boom 1998. 
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certain interplay − often portrayed as a battle − between positivity and negativity, but this 
economy is only tolerated temporarily in view of its annihilation and elevation to a new, 
stable, synthesising third term: for instance, ‘Aufhebung’, world spirit, absolute knowledge in 
Hegel’s discourse. 
Needless to say, the ‘economical’18 calling into question or ‘deconstruction’ of 
opposition is immediately joined by a second calling into question: that of the logic of 
presence and identity. Neither things nor human beings, i.e., no entities generally speaking 
can have a simple and undivided presence as such in this ‘econology’ designed by Derrida to 
interrupt and intervene into western metaphysics and particularly into the latter’s postulate of 
a human subject being the foundation of the world and of history, master and possessor all at 
once. The whole claim to a ‘self’ is called into question as soon as we accept an economy, in 
which we are always already engaged (there is no pre-existing ‘self’, the latter rather being 
produced by the economy) and in which we only become a ‘self’, however temporary, 
contingent and finite. The ‘self’ is produced, time and again, by the economy, the interplay 
with the other, and can no longer be thought of as primordial substance. The ‘in between’, the 
‘inter-’ the economy is primordial with regard to its actors, just like we have seen when 
analysing the religious relationship above: the ‘relata’ come second, the relationship first. 
The economy then brings presence, substance, essence, identity and the oppositional 
logic belonging to these determinations into play and calls them in question; it does so by 
letting them enter the realm of the ‘in between’, the interval of mere relationality. It is this 
place, this topos around which Derrida’s entire work circles. The names he gives to this place 
are ‘event’, ‘gift’, ‘khora’19, but the most categorical one is différance: difference in a 
verbalised, active mode, difference as relational event. I will return to that shortly. 
Derrida’s econological preoccupations are at first quite relevant to our discussion of 
kenosis and its two meanings, because indeed they make it possible to add a third: Derrida 
does not agree with the antagonism of distance against proximity, but much prefers an 
‘economical’ relationship between both extremes. Kenosis is always high and low: it is the 
depletion of the religious relationship into transcendence and its repletion into immanence, it 
is negative theology and positive theology, it is the withdrawal of God and His incarnation. 
Only by highlighting and studying, as well as choosing and living this double bind of kenosis, 
this ‘econokenosis’, can one do justice to kenosis. However, there is a second relevance of the 
econological approach to kenosis, one more important to my present argument. Taking into 
account the economy of the two discourses of kenosis in contemporary thought is one thing; 
we have to go a step further and consider the possibility whether kenosis is this economy: 
whether kenosis, in its third meaning, is not merely the intermingling of both meanings, but 
something radically new. Might not kenosis be this ‘place’, this ‘event’ of différance between 
God and human beings that is opened up by the economy?  
In my view, Derrida gives a clear affirmative answer to this question in his small 
treatise Sauf le nom (Post-Scriptum)20 (orig. 1993). In this remarkable book, written as a 
                                                 
18
 I use this adjective in a formal and thus uncommon meaning: ‘belonging/referring to the economy’; it has 
nothing to do with being frugal, economising, or being profitable etc. 
19
 Plato develops this enigmatic concept in his Timaeus. It eludes all meaning, all being: a ‘place’ of emptiness 
and passivity that only ‘gives’ (gives language, meaning, being); Derrida studies this Platonic concept, which 
can hardly be considered a ‘concept’, in Khôra (orig. 1987/1993), in J. Derrida, On the Name, trans. I. McLeod, 
Stanford, Ca : Stanford University Press 1995, 89-127. There he states that khôra is in fact the ‘surname’ (On the 
Name, 126) of différance (see below). 
20
 In On the Name, trans. John P. Leavey, 35-85. An earlier English version of Sauf le nom (Post-Scriptum) 
appeared in H. Coward, T. Foshay (eds.), Derrida and Negative Theology, Albany: SUNY 1992, then titled 
‘Post-Scriptum: Aporia’s, Ways and Voices’, trans. John P. Leavy. Elaborate discussions of Sauf le nom can be 
found in Hent de Vries, Philosophy and the Turn to Religion, Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University 
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dialogue between two voices,21 the author delivers a succinct but quite powerful discussion of 
kenosis and its coherence with the economy, with this ‘place’of différance we have dealt with 
so far. This ‘place’ is vital to Derrida’s own idea of kenosis in Sauf le nom, and we will see 
that it is this place and the subtle topological approach to the religious relationship it involves, 
that leads us towards a series of double binds: place – non-place, name – namelessness, 
infinite gift – singular gift, all paralleled by the double bind we meanwhile have become used 
to, that of proximity – distance.22 These double binds turn kenosis into econokenosis, into a 
never-ending negotiation between always two ‘competing’ parameters, culminating in the 
negotiation between humanity and God. Finally I will conclude with a brief reflection on 
prayer and its relationship to this topology. Here Barth’s views on prayer in his Church 
Dogmatics will be discussed. 
 
6. Kenosis in Sauf le nom 
The general notion of place, of the `topos’ is quite important to Derrida in Sauf le nom. It is 
not just any place, but always the place of kenosis: Derrida uses the word only a few times, 
one time however at a very important moment in the dialogue, where he gives a sharp 
summary of his discussion of negative theology (55/56). Negative theology – probably the 
most unreserved discourse of distance Christianity has produced, from its medieval Neo-
platonic and mystical sources onward toward the secular voices of those representing the first 
meaning of kenosis in our time as we just studied above – is right:  
– Certainly, the ‘unknowable God’23, the ignored or unrecognised God that we spoke 
of, says nothing: of him nothing is said that might hold… 
– Save his name… 
– Save the name that names nothing that might hold, not even a divinity (Gottheit), 
nothing whose withdrawal does not carry away every phrase that tries to measure 
itself against him. ‘God’ ‘is’ the name of this bottomless collapse, of this endless 
desertification of language...  
But is negative theology right? Derrida immediately continues: 
– … But the trace of this negative operation is inscribed in and on and as the event 
(what comes, what there is and which is always singular, what finds in this kenosis 
the most decisive condition of its coming or its upsurging). (55/56)  
So the second meaning is right as well! In other words, both sides of the antagonism, both 
                                                                                                                                                        
Press 1999, esp. ch. 5, ‘The Kenosis of Discourse’, 305-358; and in Dutch in Rico Sneller, Het Woord is schrift 
geworden. Derrida en de negatieve theologie (The Word has Become Scripture. Derrida and Negative 
Theology), Kampen: Kok Agora 1998. De Vries pays attention in particular to the econological side of kenosis, 
although the term ‘economy’ is not frequently used in his book: ‘The apophatic path of the über, of the 
überunmoglichste, the most impossible or more than impossible [these expressions are taken from the language 
of Angelus Silesius (see below) – LtK], is attested to as möglich, as possible; this movement of elevation, 
transcendence, hyperbole, rhetorical exaggeration, and excess paradoxically coincides with a descent and 
humiliation, a coming down to earth, or incarnation of the concept, of ontology, of phenomenology, as well as of 
their deconstruction.’ (340) 
21
 The voices might well represent the two meanings of kenosis described earlier, although Derrida does not 
identify them any further: they seem to oscillate continuously between the radicalism of Angelus Silesius’ (1624-
1677; the book is a reading of the latter’s famous Cherubinic Wanderer) negative theology, underlining the 
‘nothingness’ between God and humanity, and the equally radical passion in Silesius for the topos where the 
‘Unknown God’ and the ‘unknowing human’ may have their impossible and improbable encounter… Both 
voices alternately represent both positions. 
22
 On the possible coherence of religion and topology, see also J.S. O’Leary, ‘Topologie de l’être et topographie 
de la révélation’, in R. Kearney, J.S. O’Leary (eds.), Heidegger et la question de Dieu, Paris: Grasset 1980, 194-
237. 
23
 Derrida quotes Silesius. 
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kenotic operations might well be wrong. They both miss the economy of which kenosis 
consists: the economy  
between on the one hand ‘withdrawal’, the void, the ‘nothing’, the non-place, in short, the 
kenotic distance that rules between God and human beings, and on the other hand the place 
(‘in’ and ‘on’) where God and human beings have to ‘come’, only to be involved in an ‘event’ 
that is radically singular and unique, once-only and time and again once-only, an event that 
makes these two – God and human beings – into concrete, singular beings, for as long as the 
event lasts. Singularity defined this way has little to do with the logic of identity and presence 
discussed above; ‘singular’ is he or she that exposes him- or herself – or rather, suddenly finds 
him- or herself exposed – to the topos between the self and the other, between identities. 
Being an act (exposure) and not a state of being, singularity goes together with temporality 
and finitude. 
So the topos of kenosis can only refer to the non-topos of kenosis, the concrete event 
of the religious relationship to the silence of the void, of the non-relationship. Analysed this 
way, the topos is indeed a double bind, as I suggested above: one of the double binds 
specified and formulated by Derrida’s remarkable topology of religion, and doubtless the 
most essential one: by means of the topological determination, kenosis turns into 
econokenosis. Topology invites economy, and vice versa. 
 The same dynamics can be shown in other double binds that ring through in this 
quotation, for example, name – namelessness. God is the unnameable, transcending human 
language, human naming. Still His name must be ‘saved’, excepted, barred from this 
namelessness and nothingness (‘Sauf le nom’), although it is a name ‘that names nothing’; for 
this name is also the most concrete, ‘singular’ name that ‘comes’ to the place where the 
‘event’ will take place. This ‘name of a bottomless collapse’ is at the same time the name of 
an intimate event… between nameless transcendence and named immanence, between ‘over 
there’ and ‘here’ (56, see below).24 
 Pursuing his topological vocabulary quite rigorously, Derrida continues the quote 
given earlier – the same voice in the dialogue is still speaking: 
… There is this event, which remains, even if this remnance25 is not more substantial, 
more essential than this God, more ontologically determinable than this name of God 
of whom it is said that he names nothing that is, neither this nor that. (56) 
A little further, the other voice reminds his conversational partner: 
 – In and on, you said, that implies, apparently, some topos… 
Then the first voice describes this topos as the topos of différance, albeit with its ‘surname’, 
that of the Platonic khôra I mentioned earlier; and again the double bind is ‘played out’: being 
‘absent’ and ‘unique’: 
–…or some khôra (body without body, absent body but unique body and place of 
everything, in the place of everything, interval, place, spacing). Would you also say of 
khôra, as you were just doing in a murmur, ‘save its name’? Everything secret is 
played out here. For this location displaces and disorganises all our onto-topological 
prejudices, in particular the objective science of space. Khôra is over there but more 
                                                 
24
 See also on 58, where Derrida defines the name econokenotically as a passage (‘goes through’, ‘traversing’): 
‘As if it was necessary both to save the name and to save everything except the name, save the name, as if it was 
necessary to lose the name in order to save what bears the name, or toward which one goes through the name. 
But to lose the name is not to attack it, to destroy it or wound it. On the contrary, to lose the name is quite simply 
to respect it: as name. That is to say to pronounce it, which comes down to traversing it toward the other…’ 
On the question of name and namelessness, see also J. Rogozinski, ‘Cet innommable dans le secret des noms’, in 
P. Gisel, P. Evrard (eds.), La théologie en postmodernité, Geneva: Labor et Fides 1996, 155-170. 
25
 In French Derrida uses the newly invented ‘restance’ parallel to ‘différance’: the active remaining of the remainder. 
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‘here’ than any ‘here’… (56) 
 
So what exactly is this place, and what is the event taking place in it, as if place and event 
were virtually indistinguishable? 
If it is the place of khôra, as we just heard Derrida confirm, then the event of, on and 
as this place is différance. We know that this newly invented word ‘différance’ is, from the 
very beginning of Derrida’s work, one of its prime philosophical categories. It ‘verbalises’ the 
French word ‘différence’ by inserting an a towards the end of the word, thus changing it into 
a verb, or rather, a verbal noun: an act, a movement, a happening. Following the same line of 
thought when analysing the particular relationality of religious religion, difference here is not 
a static, logical term, used to distinguish two or more entities or identities, showing simply in 
what respect they differ. On the contrary, it goes beyond its function of distinguishing two 
pre-existent identities, becoming something ‘in itself’. It is a further, more radical and literal 
expression of ‘die Differenz als solche’ which the later Heidegger tried to think about in 
Identität und Differenz.26 This difference-as-act, as event, creates something new between the 
identities, something that cannot be reduced to the logic of identity and the realisation of the 
self. Différance is this ‘in between’, conceived as a place, for example as a desert, as khora, as 
an interval, a spacing, as we saw in Sauf le nom, and at the same time as an event taking place 
on this place and changing this place into a mere event, a moment of incision and interruption: 
this ‘desert’ is ‘desertification’ (56), this space is spacing, etc. 
 
7. Kenosis and the death of Christ 
Would this topos in fact be the topos of the revelation, in a Christian sense, the place where 
God speaks and gives Himself to human beings – a gift that can only be returned by 
humanity? Would it, more directly than we have supposed so far, refer to Christ’s kenosis 
ending in His death on the cross – an event I called pre-eminently kenotic? That would mean 
that the biblical figure of Christ is the ‘incarnation’ (in all its concreteness and singularity, in 
all the irreplaceability that is the hallmark of an event – the interruption, incision, 
intervention: the unexpected) of the différance between God and humanity, of this ‘in 
between’ or interval where the gift takes place. Closest proximity, most remote distance in 
one: ‘vere deus, vere homo’, the Christological dogma of the old church as yet another double 
bind in our series. Of course, this gift, taken seriously, can only be a tragic gift, the topos a 
tragic and violent scene. For this gift which brings along the absolutely new, singular – 
Derrida would make variations on the ancient dogma: the Messiah will be neither god nor 
human, but someone that cannot be reduced to these categories – can only forget itself, 
destroy itself, in order to be an event, to be différance, to be the deferral of identity and of 
presence that the economy of différance generates. This gift can only be kenosis, if this 
kenosis culminates in the depletion of life itself: death. Maybe that, quite simply, and well 
beyond the doctrines of sin and reconciliation that Christian theology has built, is the meaning 
of the suffering and dying of Christ. It would be the violence that is essential to kenosis, the 
violence that Vattimo can only eliminate from his post-modernist conception of kenosis, as I 
showed in the beginning. Derrida points to this violence of the kenotic gift, to this ‘death’ that 
is essential to its singularity, in his The Gift of Death, commenting on the Essays hérétiques 
(1975) of Jan Pato≠ka. We discover the same tension here again: in order to really give 
oneself in a concrete event, come close to the other, who receives, one has to give oneself 
away, forget oneself as a gift, die as the giver, and become distant to the other. In order to 
become ‘finite’ and ‘someone’ in a kenotic gift, – ‘yet’ – one has to become ‘infinite’ and no 
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 Pfullingen: Neske 1957. 
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one in the same kenotic gift. The echoes of the death of Christ can hardly be missed: 
On what condition does goodness exist beyond all calculation? On the condition that 
goodness forget itself, that the movement be a movement of the gift that renounces 
itself, hence a movement of infinite love. Only infinite love can renounce itself and, in 
order to become finite, become incarnated in order to love the other, to love the other 
as a finite other. This gift of infinite love comes from someone and is addressed to 
someone; responsibility demands irreplaceable singularity. Yet only death or rather the 
apprehension of death can give this irreplaceability…27 
 
 
8. Prayer as Prayer for Kenosis: Barth and Derrida 
Meanwhile the relevance of the topos/event of différance28 studied so far for a theological 
reflection on revelation may well be worth further investigation. It might be necessary then to 
compare this event of différance with the event of the Word of God (‘Geschehen des 
Wortes’), which Karl Barth has declared to be the centre of Christian theology in the first half 
of the previous century. 
Derrida also is interested in the Word. Reading Silesius in Sauf le nom, he posits the Word 
of God as the topos between God and human beings, where these identities get lost in a way 
in a radical kenosis. ‘Der Ort ist das Wort’ (The place is the Word), Derrida quotes Silesius 
throughout Sauf le nom (notably 57). It is the topos where God becomes the ‘name of a 
bottomless collapse’, as we already saw (55), and ‘the trace of this negative operation is 
inscribed in and on and as the event’ (56). Human beings are equally haunted by this topos, 
this Word/Place is in us (57), instead of us being in this place: in the same kenotic, 
‘bottomless’ movement that applies to God, we no longer are the subject of this place, but this 
place is subject of us, or rather between us, and between God and us. 
‘Geh hin wo du nicht kannst: sieh wo du siehest nicht: Hör wo nichts schallt und klingt, so 
bist du wo Gott spricht.’ (Go there where you cannot; see where you do not see; Hear 
where nothing rings or sounds, so are you where God speaks) (44; 59; 75) 
And after this quotation Derrida affirms:  
‘This adverb of place (wo) of the word of God, of God as word [...] indeed affirms the 
place as word of God.’ (75) 
 
Now one of the concrete and practical acts or actions that belong to this event of the 
Word/Place, of this ‘in between’ of différance, is prayer. Prayer viewed this way is nothing 
more than a question, a wish: may this event take place. What event? The event of revelation, 
the event of God giving Himself and man giving himself to... the topos of the ‘gift of loss’ 
that is kenosis. So prayer asks, in a way, only for itself: may there be nothing more than 
prayer, may there be kenosis, right there at this strange place of différance. Right after the 
crucial quotation on kenosis discussed above (55/56), Derrida shifts to the topic of prayer and 
states: ‘Prayer asks God to give himself rather than gifts.’ Prayer asks for ‘the divinity of God 
as gift or desire of giving.’ Prayer interprets God and addresses itself to God as a name for 
this event of giving. ‘And prayer is this interpretation, the very body of this interpretation (…) 
which ‘implies, apparently, some topos...’ (56) 
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 Trans. D. Wills, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1995;50-51; orig. 1992. 
28
 One often refers to this double structure place – event as to the ‘spatio-temporality’ of différance, following 
Derrida’s own initial definitions of the concept in ‘La différance’ (1968), included in Margins – of Philosophy, 
trans. A. Bass, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1982; orig. 1972. 
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It has struck me that Barth, in paragraph 49 of his Church Dogmatics (vol. III.329), 
also analyses prayer as the central event between ‘God the Father’ and His ‘Creature’. The 
Christian, who bares himself, who gives himself to the ‘Universal Lordship’ of this God, is 
characterised by faith, by obedience, but right in the ‘middle’ (Mitte) of these features Barth 
posits prayer as the key event, as a  ‘primitive moment’ (265). From this ‘middle’, all aspects 
of religious existence can always begin again:  
In all its forms prayer is this answering, this going to meet, this direct expression of 
the truth of the situation in which the christian finds himself as christian. When he 
prays, he puts himself in the position in which faith and obedience can always begin 
again at the beginning. As this primitive moment, prayer, which is the basis of all 
other activity, is included in obedience. It is itself the act of obedience par excellence, 
the act of obedience from which all other acts must spring. (265) 
This ‘primitive moment’ of prayer lies at the heart of the relationship between Creator and 
creature, which occupies Barth in this volume of Church Dogmatics which focuses on the 
relation between Creator and creature. It is always more and less than the other major ways of 
giving expression to one’s religious experience, ‘praise, thanksgiving, confession and 
penitence’ (266), because it is ‘Bitten’, ‘petition’ before anything else. It asks simply and only 
for the event of the Word, and, as this asking, it is this event, in the sense of a ‘beginning 
again at the beginning’. From this beginning, all the other acts, resumed through faith and 
obedience, can take their course, become meaningful, and offer an identity, however 
temporary, to human beings and to God, until they return again towards this beginning, this 
topos of the Word, this ‘Mitte’, this middle, this ‘in between’, in order to empty themselves, 
give themselves away in kenosis. Prayer is this strange answering as questioning, questioning 
as answering; it asks for the event, desires it, and in this asking, this ‘Bitten’, it is the event 
itself, it is the ‘Mitte’. 
Although sketched out tentatively here, it seems to me that the resemblance between 
Barth’s articulation of prayer and Derrida’s kenotic approach is considerable. This 
resemblance, this touching in the formal and thematic dynamics of their writing becomes even 
more penetrating if we realise that Barth tries to formulate a certain topology of prayer. Prayer 
is a place or a space where the ‘qualitative difference’ between God and man, which plays 
such an important role in Barth’s second Romans commentary30, becomes an event in itself 
(this difference, in Derrida’s words, is a quality in itself, a différance) apart from who God is 
and who human beings are. Prayer is a topos of ‘Bitte’, exactly because it is a ‘Mitte’. But 
what does this topological passion in Barth’s text mean? 
I will make one observation that seems theologically and philosophically important to 
me. The topos of prayer leads us back immediately to Barth’s Christology, and thus to the 
beginning of 49 mentioned above. For what is this ‘Mitte’ of prayer in its purest, ‘primitive’ 
form? What is at stake in this topology of a place between God and human beings, where the 
event of gift and giving away (kenosis) takes place, where the event simply seems to be this 
place, where prayer seems to be at first a prayer for the event of prayer, where prayer ‘hap-
pens’ with a specific dynamic of its own, irreducible to any ‘content’? The event of prayer as 
‘Mitte’ refers unmistakably, as I see it, to the Christ event. Christ is proclaimed to be the 
‘constitutive and organising centre (Mitte) of the world process’ (241), and the Christian, who 
is defined ultimately and decisively as ‘someone who prays’ in the later stages of the para-
graph, is nothing more and nothing less than the one who opens himself onto this ‘Mitte’, 
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 Eds. G.W. Bromley, T.F. Torrance, Edinburgh: T. &T. Clarke 1936-1977. The paragraph is entitled ‘God the 
Father as Lord of His Creature' 
30
 The Epistle to the Romans, trans. E. C. Hoskyns, London: Oxford University Press 1933, 39; orig. 1922. 
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where he or she sees the invisible and encounters the impossible, as Derrida would say (see 
e.g. Sauf le nom, 75). That is to say, this invisible and impossible place/event is invisible and 
impossible according to the logic of the world process. The ‘Mitte’ haunts this process and 
interrupts it from within, being its ‘other’. We know that this topos of the Christ event, that 
Barth sometimes calls ‘Ort’ (‘point’239), sometimes ‘Stelle’ (‘source’, 243), sometimes 
‘Wirklichkeit’ (‘actuality', 268), is everything but a foundational substance of the so-called 
world process; rather it splits this process in two, like an abyss or a limit or a crisis. It is the 
‘vacuum’, ‘die leere Mitte’ (empty middle) in the relationship between God and human 
beings, it is the ‘offene Stelle’ (unoccupied place) in our knowledge of God and also in every 
dogmatics, as Barth formulates towards the end of Church Dogmatics, vol. I.2. Or, in the 
language of the second Romans commentary, this topos of the Christ event is ‘the opening in 
the centre (Mitte) of a wheel’, a metaphor he uses again in Church Dogmatics, vol. I.2., 
describing Christian doctrine – and his own theology as well – as the wheel.31 
It appears to me that it is Barth’s challenge but also his struggle to use this radically 
kenotic topology of a ‘Mitte’ to structure his reflection on prayer and thence his entire 
Christology within the framework of a doctrine of providence, and more specifically, to use it 
as a paradoxical foundation or ground for God’s ‘Weltherrschaft’ (world reign). For however 
difficult it is to define and delimit kenosis in a straightforward manner seeing that the term is 
an economy between terms, as I have shown, at least it can be defined as the opposite of 
providence. At least we find a sharp contrast here with Derrida’s topologies, because the 
latter’s work does not seem to be interested in providence, salvation or any other victorious 
logic. For Derrida, the providence of God, like any concept of a history of salvation, still falls 
back into the logocentric structure of identity, which manoeuvres God – and maybe even 
humanity after the ‘death of God’ – into some stable, universal, or eternal position with regard 
to the topos of différance. But if this topos is Barth’s ‘Mitte’, and this ‘Mitte’ is Christ, and 
Christ, as the son of human beings (‘Menschensohn’) is the Son of God, then God is not an 
identity. God is not an identity, but a name to be ‘saved’: a name involved in an event that 
Derrida reticently calls différance and Barth, much less reticently, calls ‘das geschehende 
Wort’.32  
 
The place and the Word is one, 
and were the place not 
(of all eternal eternity!) 
the Word would not be. 
 
Angelus Silesius, The Cherubinic Wanderer, I: 205 
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 Church Dogmatics I.2, 867. 
32
 I would like to refer to an earlier publication on the philosophical analysis of economy: L. ten Kate, 
‘Economies of Excess’, in D. Dolron, Exaltation - Images of Religion and Death, DDH Foundation, 
Amsterdam 2000,  14-19; and to an earlier publication on Barth and Derrida: L. ten Kate, ‘Randgänge der 
Theologie. Prolegomena einer “Theologie der Differenz” im Ausgang von Derrida und Barth’, in 
Zeitschrift für dialektische Theologie 14-1, autumn 1998, 9-31, which will be followed by a book on this 
subject in 2002. 
